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ABSTRACT 
Abby Flickinger: The Politics of Everyday Subversion: Crisis, COVID-19, and Coming-of-
Age in Córdoba, Argentina 
 This thesis seeks to explore the impact of converging political, economic, and 
public health crises in Córdoba, Argentina in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic with a 
focus on youth and practices of protest and resistance. Utilizing interviews, participant 
observations and ethnographic data in addition to economic and public health statistics, 
media coverage, and government statements I establish the basis and context for this 
triple crisis, as well as the tactics appropriated to criticize the government and 
expression disillusionment — protests and subversion. Despite modifications to public 
health concerns, the Argentine democratic tradition of protesting returned against 
government wishes, and became a canvas of expression for new subversive meanings to 
enhance movement messages. Protests also became a place to express local culture and 
youth subculture, as young people appropriated private and public spaces to recreate 
cultural practices in an attempt to rebuild a sense of normalcy. Cognizant of the nuance 
and complexities of pandemic management, young people sought not to rebel and 
topple the government, but rather entered a state of self-governance, choosing to 
undermine government protocols they deemed unnecessary to return themselves to a 
sense of normalcy the government had failed to, and to reconstruct a semblance of the 
future that has been dismantled by the ensuing triple crisis.  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Introduction 
 On March 20th, 2020, as the Argentine government declared a nationwide 
lockdown to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Overnight the city of Córdoba, Argentina 
transformed into a ghost town; bars packed the night before sat empty, the loud 
morning commute silenced, and police stood guard on every corner. The lockdown 
quickly transformed from a two-week precautionary measure to an ongoing reality. 
Businesses were boarded up, tens of thousands lost their jobs, and lines grew outside of 
food banks. COVID-19 case numbers began to rise from tens to hundreds. This early 
self-induced paralysis was heralded, and set the tone for Latin America. However, this 
lockdown approach began to break down, cases skyrocketed, and Argentines faced a 
difficult situation of convergent political, economic, and public health crises.  
Research Question 
 The onset of COVID-19 converged with a preexisting economic recession and a 
political transition from a center-right neoliberal administration to a center-left Peronist 
administration. Córdoba, the nation’s second city, found itself in a multi-dimensional 
economic, political, and public health crisis that fundamentally restructured everyday 
life while calling the future into question as the result of state’s failure to protect the 
population on these fronts. This begs the central research question: How have the 
people of Córdoba responded to this triple crisis catalyzed by COVID-19? This project 
explores this question through the analysis of federal government policies and protest 
practices in Córdoba in response to this triple crisis. This thesis specifically focuses on 
youth society in Córdoba and practices of protest and resistance.   
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 To answer this question, this thesis concretely examines three key sub-questions. 
Firstly, what policies taken the Macri administration (2015-2019) and the current 
Fernández administration (2019-present) have contributed to political and economic 
turmoil that then intersected with and exacerbated the COVID-19 pandemic?  Secondly, 
how did the people of Córdoba mobilize politically and organize protests in 2020 
throughout the phases of lockdown to highlight these crises and denounce government 
responses? Thirdly, what was the response of youth society in Córdoba to this triple 
crisis and how did young adults cultivate new forms of interacting, socializing, and 
protesting in this situation? Each of these questions will be addressed in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis.   
Argument 
 This thesis argues that Cordobense youth became disillusioned by state failures to 
contain the spread of COVID-19 and adequately navigate the economic fallout of these 
failed approaches, and embraced a politics of everyday subversion. Rather than taking 
to the streets to topple the government or organize strikes, Cordobense youth expressed 
disenchantment with the government but understood the exceptionalism of the 
situation. Cordobense youth turned to practices of subversion that flouted the public 
health restrictions put in place by the government, and embraced a return to 
togetherness, dancing, music, and socializing—youth subcultural rebellion. This became 
a form of youth protest against the failures of the government and the sense that the 
future possibilities of the nation were being constrained.  They sought to restore a sense 
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of normalcy to their lives, motivated not to combat the government, but rather to form a 
sense of solidarity and re-create a recognizable future for themselves. 
Methodology and Overview 
 This thesis is a mixed-methods study of the political, economic, and public health 
crisis in Argentina, its impact on traditional social and cultural phenomena, and 
subsequent your responses in Córdoba, Argentina. To do this, I conducted IRB approved 
interviews with 10 young people from Córdoba, all middle class and in their early 
twenties, with a mixture of male and female participants. In addition to interviews, I 
gathered ethnographic data though participant observation. I lived in the city from 
March 1st until the end of December, 2020, experiencing normal life before lockdown in 
addition to COVID management measures. I conducted research in public spaces like 
cafes, bars, restaurants, and storefronts, as well as parks, plazas, and the street itself. I 
also witnessed numerous protests, youth practices, and had countless informal 
conversations covering topics from Argentina and politics to COVID-19 and how life has 
been fundamentally changed since the onset of the pandemic. 
 This thesis contains four chapters.  Chapter 1 is a literature review. This discusses 
the scholarship on: 1) the contemporary political economy of Argentina; 2) the public 
health situation in Argentina; 3) COVID-19 in Argentina; and 4) national protest 
culture. Chapter 2 examines the political, economic, and public health policies pursued 
by the Macri and Fernández administrations. This chapter draws upon economic 
statistics and public health data in addition to public government statements. Chapter 3 
focuses on protests and activism in Córdoba as a response to the failures of the 
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government. This relies on participation observation conducted in Córdoba in 2020 and 
data collected from observations and encounters with protests, as well as photos, videos, 
and media accounts. Chapter 4 explores the political responses of youth society in 
Córdoba. The data for this chapter comes from participant observation and interview 
conducted with young Cordobenses. 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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 In this literature review, I begin with an overview of the modern Argentine 
political economy focusing on events and policies essential to understanding the current 
landscape. Next, I examine the public health system, its political influencers, and the 
current health insurance system. The subsequent section offers background on 
COVID-19, and a brief overview of its impact in Argentina. Finally, I discuss Argentina’s 
storied protest culture, highlighting key events and their lasting influence, as well as 
contributions to Argentina’s democracy.  
Political Economy  
 Carlos Menem served as the president of Argentina from 1989 until 1999 as a 
member of the Justicialist or Peronist Party. Menemism, the term coined to describe his 
political approach, is a conservative platform (Calvo 2012: 157), and defined by its 
neoliberal approach (Stefanoni 2019: 225), with an aggressive stance to tackling the 
hyperinflation and chronic instability. Four key principles that defined Menem's 
neoliberal approach included trade liberalization, privatization, labor reforms, and 
financialization. This led to the weakening of the social safety net and deregulation of 
the labor market, resulting in lower wages (Wylde 2016: 8-9). His actions rang true to 
his 1991 declaration that redirecting Argentina into stability would be “a tough, costly, 
and severe adjustment’, requiring ‘major surgery without anesthesia’” (Wylde 2016: 8). 
Menem’s rise to power in the wake of an economic collapse gave him strategic 
negotiating powers that permitted him to achieve his desired economic goals to further 
the neoliberal agenda. Decentralization shifted many responsibilities to the provinces, 
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like education and healthcare, with an execution strategy that forced provinces to align 
with the national government in order to receive funding. Though ending 
hyperinflation, Menem’s market reform strategy strategy would backfire, resulting in 
growing unemployment, poverty, and income inequality. His administration set the 
stage for the largest economic collapse in Argentine history in 2001 (Levitsky 2003: 
152).  
  The years 1999-2003 are an exceptional time marked by economic collapse and a 
revolving door of presidents — Fernando de la Rúa, Ramon Puerta, Eduardo Camaño, 
Adolfo Rodríguez Sa, and finally, Eduardo Duhalde, who arranged for the subsequent 
democratic election. Though recession began in 1998, it would not reach its height until 
the convertabilidad, an economic policy that pegged the Argentine peso to the US 
dollar, thus draining the national cash reserves, was undone and the peso decreased by 
nearly 70% (Levitsky 2003: 155) in a matter of weeks. This disastrous policy decision, 
along with the massive national debt accrued under Menem, and reduction in taxes 
resulted in a 25% unemployment rate, and more than half of all Argentinians living in 
poverty in 2002 (Levitsky 2003: 155). This legacy remains with the Argentine people, as 
many still look to foreign markets for wealth and savings security, constantly aware of 
the precariousness of hyperinflation and instability.  
 The 2003 election of center-left Peronist Néstor Kirchner pushed Argentina onto 
a new course. Kirchner was widely successful, economically and socially, brokering debt 
reduction with foreign creditors, putting policies in place that led to a 70% increase in 
real wages, and overhauling the Supreme Court. This led to the annulment of laws 
limiting persecution of human rights violations by the 1976-83 dictatorial regime 
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(Levitsky 2008: 17-18). Conversely, his presidency is also remembered for concentrating 
executive power. Kirchner issued 232 executive decrees during his tenure and 
established provincial reliance on federal fiscal transfers (Levitsky 2008: 19). The 
Kirchner administration put in place a new development approach called neo-
developmentalism that rejected neoliberalism and embraced stronger state control of 
the economy and an emphasis on agricultural exports (Mendoza 2018).    
 Succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in 2007, Kirchnerism 
continued and grew into a distinct political tradition (Mendoza 2018). Whereas Nestor 
Kirchner’s economic policies were supported by a global commodities boom that 
permitted the expansion of social programs, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was less 
successful. Her administration’s attempt to raise agricultural export taxes in 2008 
dramatically backfired, resulting in massive protests and a battle with the media. 
Midterm elections resulted in massive party loses (Calvo 2012: 155). However, the 
continued commodity boom and the lack of a true opposition front led to her reelection 
in 2011. The subsequent drop in commodity prices resulted in cuts to subsidy programs, 
and growing redistributionist policies. Inflation grew sharply but was intentionally 
manipulating downward by administration meddling in the INDEC economic statistics 
office of the federal government (Calvo 2012: 157-159). In 2015, Fernández de Kirchner’s 
chosen candidate, Daniel Scioli, lost to the center-right candidate, Mauricio Macri. The 
struggling economy was then handed over to a non-Peronist candidate for the first time 
in decades. 
  Mauricio Macri appealed to conservatives and anti-Peronist voters, particularly 
the alienated middle class that did not reap equal benefits from social spending 
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programs implemented under Kirchnerism. His single term began with promise, before 
falling victim to economic forces — the peso waned, the comfortable middle class lost 
purchasing power, poverty and unemployment rose, and real wages declined. He was 
defeated in 2019 by the ‘Frente de Todos’ Peronist ticket that ran Alberto Fernández 
with Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as his running mate. These two presidencies will be 
discussed in greater detail in later chapters.  
Public Health 
 The Argentine healthcare system in the most fragmented in Latin America 
(Bernal 2019: 29), following a decentralization that took place largely under Menem in 
the 1990s. The transition was abrupt, poorly planned, underfunded, resulting in a 
massive variance from province to province as well as between municipalities across the 
country. The federalist political system affords each province with great powers of self-
determination. However, many provinces shifted the burden of directing the healthcare 
sector onto municipalities. The healthcare infrastructure thus varies widely: poorer 
provinces and rural areas are faced with shortages of medical personnel, whereas richer 
zones and metropolitan areas have sufficient medical providers. The lack of adequate 
access to healthcare perpetuates an underestimation of existing health problems and 
overestimation of an individual’s overall health, reinforcing the correlation between 
poverty and morbidity (De Maio 2007: 287). 
  The public health system is shaped by political influence. Each province is 
regulated by a Minister of Health without national oversight or coordination, which, 
when paired with a system established on insufficient funding, leaves the healthcare 
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system reliant on governal leadership (Bernal 2019).  However, a 2019 study reviewing 
mayoral alignments and healthcare provisions in the Conurbano — the densely 
populated municipalities surrounding the City of Buenos Aires — since the 1980s found 
that communities with mayors who did not align with the governor had superior health 
services compared to those in alignment (Garay 2019). Mayoral alignment resulted in 
weakened healthcare infrastructure and lower healthcare funding. Due to the automatic 
provincial transfers associated with providing healthcare services, non aligned mayors 
rely on these to build political coalitions through strong health services (Garay 2019). 
Those mayors who rely on the patronage networks that come from alignment tend to 
govern municipalities with higher poverty rates (Garay 2019: 107).  
  The health insurance system has three different types of coverage: [fill in the 
blank here].  Due to decentralization, underfunding, and the rise of private insurance, 
there are some groups with double coverage while others are insufficiently insured. The 
tri-part system is further subdivided, and varies between provinces, resulting in 
inefficient risk pooling and variable degrees of coverage. Publicly funded healthcare is 
primarily comprised of those not eligible for other programs, namely the impoverished 
or members of the informal sector. Social health insurance accounts for 54% of the 
population (Cavagnero 2010: 5). These plans—and what they cover—are negotiated by 
unions. Private insurance, viewed as the highest quality option, is made up of those who 
can afford to buy-in. Receiving subsidized healthcare is increasingly difficult, as 
healthcare services are underfunded and subsidization requests are denied at higher 
rates.  
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The current public health situation in Argentina is juggling the desire for private 
and universal options. The drastic changes from administration to administration has 
created policy inconsistencies in funding, access, and coverage. 
COVID-19 
 SARS-CoV-2, better known as COVID-19, is a novel coronavirus that arose in 
Wuhan, China and became a global pandemic—this was declared by the World Health 
Organization on March 11th, 2020 (Tagliazucchi 2020: 1). It most commonly manifests 
as a respiratory syndrome, with many general symptoms overlapping with influenza; 
upon infection, the virus attacks the respiratory system causing general discomfort, 
cough, fever, difficulty breathing, and in advancing cases pneumonia, dyspnea, and even 
death (Russo 2020: 347). Since the beginning of the pandemic, there have been more 
than 132,000,000 confirmed cases and over 2,880,000 deaths (WHO 2021: 1). Impact 
varies around the globe, but as the virus has progressively spread, the Americas have 
been hit the hardest, accounting for more than 57,000,000 confirmed cases and 
1,384,000 confirmed deaths as of April 2021 (WHO 2021: 1). Myriad containment 
strategies have been implemented, from complete lockdowns in effected regions of 
China to virtual non-action in Brazil. Other nations have balanced quarantines, social 
distancing, and obligatory mask use. Success is impacted by political, social, economic, 
and public health factors, making a universal strategy impossible, and leaving higher-
risk populations vulnerable to strategic failures within and across borders. 
  The first case of COVID-19 in Argentina was confirmed on March 3rd in Buenos 
Aires, and a complete lockdown was declared, beginning at 0:00 on March 20th. The 
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national reaction was swift and aggressive, sealing the national and provincial borders, 
grounding all flights, closing all businesses except grocery stores and pharmacies, and 
restricting movement with police checkpoints on major thoroughfares and within 
metropolitan areas. The initial rise in cases slowly decreased with time, before the 
national quarantine mandate expired on April 26th, after which provinces with lower 
case numbers began to relax measures, and densely populated or highly infected areas 
remained under strict measures (Tagliazucchi 2020: 3). The Buenos Aires Metropolitan 
Area (AMBA), composed of the province of Buenos Aires and the Autonomous City of 
Buenos Aires, holds the lion-share of cases, in addition to the highest population 
density. Reported cases have risen steeply since reopening measures began, particularly 
accelerating through the months of August in September. In response, the government 
has reimplemented many lockdown measures in areas with declining hospital 
capacities.  
 The impacts of Argentina’s stringent measures, which endured for more than 100 
days in many places, range from drastic economic fallout to psychological effects related 
to lockdown. Business shutdowns led to thousands of permanent closures and loss of 
employment, disrupting both the formal and informal sectors, and leaving many in 
newfound or worsening poverty and mounting food and housing insecurity (Alzúa 
2020). Social distancing and isolation led to widespread mental and physical health 
declines, as well as a rise in reports of domestic violence and resulting deaths (Polischuk 
2020). Assistance services vary greatly from province to province, and between 
municipalities themselves, leaving many without options or relief. The psychological 
stress caused by fear-oriented media has also led to behavioral and social fallout, as 
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collective interest is exhausted, misinformation grows, and apathy takes over for some, 
leading to polarization (Bavel 2020).  
Argentina’s Protest Culture 
 A critical extension of the democratic system, protest culture in Argentina is built 
upon tradition and memory, as demonstrations utilize a wide array of tactics to invoke 
emotion, displaying intention, and incite change. Over the last thirty years, major 
protests present different sets of tactics—the political repertoire that is available to 
activists (Fuentes 2012: 463). Through collective action, political actors command 
national attention, influence the government, and transform their own social identities 
(Wolff 207: 7). From the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo protesting the disappearance of 
their children under the dictatorship (1976-1983) to the protests against COVID-19 
restrictions, protestors draw upon a diverse set of tactics to create national solidarity 
and work to change existing conditions (Wolff 2007:9; Fuentes 2012:452; Lapenga 
2015:73). 
 One major protest form is the cacerolazo. Cacerolazos involve the banging of 
empty pots and pans in the streets. This is disruptive due to the noise, grabs public 
attention, and directs it to the symbolism of empty pots and pans. The first cacerolazo 
erupted spontaneously with the economic collapse in 2001, symbolic of the empty 
dishes of the people as their currency devalued due to the unpegging of the Argentine 
peso from the US dollar, and the corralito that limited the amount of money that could 
be withdrawn from banks (Epstein 2003: 6). The impact of this crisis was not just on the 
poor and working classes, but also on the middle class (Villalón 2002: 91). Since its 
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inception, the cacerolazo has been a tool utilized beyond the framework of a political 
party or union, expressing discontent. The simple protest tools (pots and pans) give it 
universal accessibility to all demographics.  It also has a deep resonance and ingrained 
meaning associated with the banging of empty pots and pans because there is nothing to 
be put in them (Villalón 2002: 91). 
 Another key protest form is associated with the piqueteros. The piquetero 
phenomenon grew to prominence in the mid-1990s. Piqueteros are known for the ‘corta 
de ruta’ (Lapenga 2015: 2) in which participants organize and block roads to put 
pressure on the government and raise awareness for their particular issue (Wolff 2007: 
7). These early actions against the neoliberal Menem administration involved drawing 
attention to unemployment and the failure of the center-right Peronist party politics at 
the time (Villalón 107, Lapenga 2015: 71, Epstein 2003: 4). Beginning with a blockade of 
National Route 22 following a layoff from a YPF oil facility, the piqueteros become 
synonymous with the unemployed and the workers’ movement (Epstein 2003: 2, Wolff 
2007: 6). This protest style was so effective at paralyzing parts of the country that 
provincial and federal administrations attempted to incorporate the demands of 
activists into their platforms. The center-left Kirchner government developed social 
programs to address some their concerns.  
 A very different movement erupted in 2008 regarding export taxes on farming 
commodities. This movement of farmers—small, medium, and large—used the tactics of 
the piqueteros but had a different political orientation. In 2008, the global price of soy 
was high. The Fernández de Kirchner administration moed to raise the retenciones — 
export taxes on soy. A coalition of farmers utilized the roadblock strategies to protest the 
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tax increase (Lapenga 2015: 76). During this dispute, the historically fragmented 
agricultural sector united against government tax increases that were intended to be 
used to fund redistribution efforts related to social programs (Richardson 2009: 231; 
Mangonnet 2020: 1228). The movement was successful and forced President Fernández 
de Kirchner to retract the retenciones increase.  
 There is also the opportunity for symbolic performances that protest existing 
government policies. The Plaza del Maya protesters used white scarves during the harsh 
dictatorship-era. Mothers and grandmother silently walked around the Plaza de Mayo 
outside of the Casa Rosada protesting government violence against dissidents. These 
scarves then reappeared during the movement to legalize abortion. These ‘protest 
performances’ (Fuentes 2012: 450) use aesthetics and symbolism to create meaning 
among onlookers (Fuentes 2012: 459). Symbolic performances may also be semi-
comedic or absurd, most notably an instance of a family taking their summer vacation to 
the bank, equipped with beach chairs, towels, and bathing suits, to express their 
discontent with the corralito. The family physically represented the invasion of their 
personal property by the bank (and government), which was felt by much of the middle 
class. This ‘active appropriation of space’ (Fuentes 2012: 456) reinforces the idea that 
protests and movements seek to inspire participation, disrupt specific patterns, or 
invoke memory (Villalón 2002: 42, Fuentes 2012: 451). 
Conclusion 
 In this literature review I establish the foundation for the current triple crisis — 
politically, economically, and regarding public health. I also discuss traditional response 
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methods, namely protests, as a means of democratic participation and holding the 
government accountable. In this thesis I am to contribute the first study of youth protest 
and everyday subversion in Córdoba, Argentina during the pandemic based on 
participant observation and interviews. 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Chapter 2: The Triple Crisis 
Introduction 
 This chapter examines the emergences of a triple crisis with political, economic, 
and public health dimensions. It begins with a look at the Macri administration and the 
economic turmoil that ensued in the second half of his term, leading to a massive rise in 
inflation and an IMF emergency loan. It then examines the onset of the pandemic and 
the public health emergency this created. Finally, it investigates the Fernández 
government and the interaction between political, health, and economic problems. This 
chapter argues that the trifold scope of Argentina’s current crisis — political legitimacy 
questioned following neoliberal failures under Macri and inherited by Fernández, a pre-
existing recession further intensified by the impacts of COVID, and the pandemic 
induced public health crisis. This chapter offers context for disillusionment as mistrust 
was fostered on multiple fronts, each contributing to the worsening of the others. To do 
this, this chapter methodologically draws on data from INDEC, CAME, WHO, and the 
IMF, as well as government public health decrees and statements. 
The Economy Under Macri (2015-2019)  
 Following the economic collapse at the turn of the millennium , the Argentine 1
economy has remained on precarious footing, with investors wary and quick to panic. 
The administration of Mauricio Macri proved to be no different, unfolding as a tale of 
two halves. The first two years of his term — 2016 and 2017 — saw prosperity and signs 
 Beginning in 1998, Argentina fell into an economic depression that would last until 2002, 1
resulting in massive nationwide protests in 2001 following a default on $132 million USD of 
debt which sent more than half of the population into poverty.  
!22
of growth under his ‘gradualistic’ (Sturzenegger 2019: 1) or slow transition back to a 
neoliberal economic model. The second two years—2018 and 2019—were marked by 
policy failure. Macri’s policies ultimately led to a deepening recession, the flight of 
investors, and the turn toward the IMF. The Argentine people too lost trust in the 
administration, visible in the primary presidential elections which opponent Alberto 
Fernández won handily, by nearly 16 percentage points (Gedan 2019: 1). This sparked 
an even larger investor exodus for fear of the return of Peronism to the Casa Rosada, 
which became a reality a few weeks later.  
 Macri’s economic plan began by enacting several policy changes that served as 
central tenants of his administration on the campaign trail, particularly involving 
taxation. Key pillars include “Workers are not going to pay income taxes ” and the 2
“Reduction and elimination of export duties, opening of exports and elimination of ROE 
(Registry of Sworn Declarations of Foreign Sales), general reduction of the levels of 
effective tax pressure and creation of the Ministry of Agroindustry ”. The administration 3
immediately sought out income, corporate, and export tax cuts, all key pieces to market 
liberalization. A platform that garnered support in the agrarian provinces, Macri rolled 
back retenciones — export taxes, in this case specifically for agricultural products — to 
fractions of those imposed under the previous Peronist administration. Wheat, corn, 
and sunflower retenciones were eliminated, and soy, the nation’s most profitable 
 “Los trabajadores no van a pagar [el] impuesto a las Ganancias” (“Las 20 Promesas De 2
Campana De Mauricio Macri.” Clarín)
 Reducción y eliminación de los derechos de exportación, apertura de las exportaciones y 3
eliminaciones de los ROE (Registro de Declaraciones Juradas de Ventas al Exterior), reducción 
general de los niveles de presión tributaria efectiva y creación del Ministerio de Agroindustria 
(“Macri prometió "eliminar las retenciones a las exportaciones" si gana las elecciones en 2015.” 
Infobae)
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agricultural product, saw a drop in retenciones from 35% to 30% (Slipczuk 2020). These 
retenciones had long been used to manage fiscal deficits, particularly during the soy 
boom in 2008, in which higher global market prices allowed soy production to fund the 
expansion of many social programs under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Wylde 2010: 
11). Finally, Macri lifted currency controls to create a ‘floating currency’, based on 
market supply and demand rather than a set government exchange rate This led to the 
devaluation of the peso, making Argentine products, especially agricultural goods, more 
competitive in the global market.  
 These tax cut and liberalization policies expanded the fiscal deficit. Macri took 
steps to remedy the shortfall through austerity measures. First, there were cuts to 
government subsidies for energy and transportation, which greatly contributed to the 
deficit — which reached 6.3% of the national GDP by 2017 (IMF 2017), but had helped 
protect reals wages for the lower and working classes. To meet fiscal shortfalls, Macri 
turned to borrowing while the Argentine economy went through the process of 
liberalization. To attract foreign capital, the Argentine government had to deal with 
holdout vulture funds that had refused to restructure bonds related to the debt default 
of 2001. Macri decided to pay off the vulture funds to the tune of $4.65 billion (Blitzer 
2016: 1). Macri’s strategies showed success initially: inflation dropped to 17% by 2017 
after spending a decade fluctuating between 25% and 40% (Kovalski 2019: 4) and his 
party secured sweeping midterm election wins in the legislature.   
 The Macri administration’s neoliberal reforms seemed to be achieving the desired 
goals of decreasing inflation, diminishing public spending, improving GDP, shrinking 
poverty, and restructuring the economy toward financialization. According to 
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Sturzenegger (2019), a former central banker (2015-2018) in Argentina, the Macri 
administration was too successful. Feeling secure in his post-midterm power, Macri 
sided with the Treasury to pressure the Central Bank into increasing inflation targets: 
keeping inflation from lowering as quickly as projected by lowering interest rates. This 
aimed to reduced government spending on pensions, which were a significant 
contributor to the deficit and could only be readjusted with respect to inflation every 
three months . However, the Central Bank is understood to be an entity autonomous 4
from the government, despite this not being legally defined. Though investors knew that 
the former Kirchnerist administrations had influenced the Central Bank, the credibility 
of the Macri administration—as a neoliberal—turned on maintaining the institution’s 
neutrality. Macri’s move created a legitimacy crisis for the institution. This incited 
investor panic and led to a massive reduction in foreign investment. As investors and 
dollars fled Argentine markets, the peso rapidly devalued, and inflation increased 
(Sturzenegger 2019). By linking growth to foreign investment attracted by liberalization, 
the Macri administration was put in a difficult spot once foreign investors fled. To head 
off default, the government once again—like the previous neoliberal administration of 
Menem—turned to the IMF, this time for a $57 billion loan, the largest in the 
organization’s history. It also increased austerity measures, reintroduced retenciones, 
and raising interest rates to 60% — the highest in the world at the time, during the 
second half of 2018 (IMF 2019).  
 Pensions make up a significant government expenditure — 7.4% of GDP and 35% of total 4
government spending in 2015. Macri enacted a law in which every 3 months pensions would be 
modified based on the inflation rate. By slowing the disinflation rate, he would improve the 
condition of the growing fiscal deficit (MECON 2015) (Dudine 2016).
!25
 The final nail in the administration’s coffin came in 2019’s primary elections, 
essentially a mock run of the presidential election shortly after, in which competitor 
Alberto Fernández handily defeated Macri. Economic hardships are not uncommon, but 
the severity of the situation forced Macri to backslide on major campaign promises, 
namely on retenciones, which weakened support among his voting base. His policies 
alienated lower and working class Argentines; retenciones were crucial to keeping 
domestic food prices low and subsidy cuts to basic necessities like utilities led to 
growing struggles for lower-income brackets. Additionally, food insecurity grew and the 
cost of living increased . Finally, Argentine skepticism towards the IMF is well known 5
following the organization’s perceived role in the 2001-2002 economic crisis that forced 
millions into poverty and left nearly 1 in 5 unemployed (MacEwan 2014). In addition to 
these shortcomings, the Peronists united behind the Frente de Todos ticket of Alberto 
Fernández, as the presidential candidate, with former president Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, as vice presidential candidate. The Fernández-Fernández ticket ultimately 
won and ushered in a new era in Argentina politics. The neoliberal experiment ended 
 Export oriented populism, utilities from somewhere5
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Use of IMF credit (DOD, current 
US$) 2,799,231,196.70 2,715,603,927.60 2,876,808,116.40 30,922,512,047.70 46,924,457,621.20
Foreign direct investment, net 
inflows (BoP, current US$) 11,758,994,011.30 3,260,164,341.80 11,516,861,462.30 11,872,856,662.80 6,663,062,112.00
GDP (current US$) 594,749,285,413.20 557,531,376,218.00 642,695,864,756.40 519,871,519,807.80 449,663,446,954.10
GDP growth (annual %) 2.7 -2.1 2.7 -2.5 -2.2
GDP per capita (current US$) 13,789.10 12,790.20 14,591.90 11,683.90 10,006.10
Figure 1 -Argentine Economic Data from World Development Indicator
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after just one term, with a 3.4% decrease in GDP, inflation rates between 240 and 300%, 
a 10% decrease in per capita income, and rising poverty rates from 2015 to 2019 
(Kovalski 2019). 
Coronavirus in Argentina 
 Argentina has been in a recession since 2018 and entering 2020 the IMF forecast 
an 11.8% contraction in the national GDP (Iglesias 2020). The arrival of the COVID-19 
virus turned an already bleak economic outlook into an emergency, as government-
mandated closures and restrictions led to the closure of businesses and ground the 
economy, and life, to a screeching halt. 
 The first case of COVID-19, a middle-aged man returning from Milan, Italy, was 
reported on March 3rd in Buenos Aires. Over the next few days, more cases appeared in 
the capital and other cities around the country. On March 11th, a 14-day mandatory 
quarantine was enacted for all people entering the country from highly affected regions, 
including China, the United States, and all of Europe. As reports of community 
transmission began, President Fernández declared a nationwide lockdown commencing 
on March 20th (‘Argentina: Prioritizing Health…’ 2020) . The aggressive response was 
widely heralded, particularly as case numbers were skyrocketing in other parts of the 
world. All non-essential movement was restricted: all flights were grounded, national 
and provincial borders were closed, movement within provinces and cities was 
monitored by police checkpoints, all non-essential businesses were shuttered, masks 
were made mandatory, and the population was only permitted to leave their homes for 
necessities. Other than small exceptions for essential employees, these restrictions were 
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applied universally and would endure until mid-April when slight regional flexibilities, 
like leaving the home for walks and exercise, would commence in sparsely populated 
areas (‘Argentina: Prioritizing Health…’ 2020). 
 The relaxation of national restrictions was slow-moving, and provinces were 
afforded the power to reinstate regulations to manage specific outbreaks. The city and 
province of Buenos Aires remained under the strictest restrictions, suffering from  the 
overwhelming majority of cases for much of the pandemic. The metropolitan area faced 
several periods of increased restriction for growing case numbers. 
  Government decisions have been perceived as inconsistent in some cases. The 
lockdown was initially to last until March 31st but was extended in two-week increments 
multiple times.  In Córdoba, the businesses allowed to reopen under limited capacities 
and social distancing requirements seemed to occur at random. For example, bars and 
restaurants were opened for in-person indoor and outdoor seating until midnight on 
July 7th, whereas gyms were not allowed to reopen at any capacity until mid-August 
(Viola 2020)(‘Reabren…’ 2020). Moreover, locations with few to no cases were subject 
to strict lockdowns identical to those in the most impacted cities for weeks on end. This 
began to generate popular beliefs that lockdown measures were an unnecessary strategy 
and destroyed local economies. With each lockdown extension, the economic calamity 
compounded (‘Argentina: Prioritizing Health…’ 2020). This facilitated massive anti-
lockdown and anti-government protests in major cities across the country, Córdoba 
being no exception, particularly as case numbers continued to rise in spite of 
preventative measures.  
!28
 Despite the initial promise under strict lockdown, case numbers began to grow 
with the loosened restrictions. Case numbers closed in on 1.5 million by the end of 
November 2020 (WHO 2020), making the outbreak in Argentina one of the worst in the 
world. Many families could no longer stay at home due to the declining peso and rising 
unemployment, homelessness, and food insecurity. Economically precarious households 
were forced to brave health risks in order to survive, particularly relying on the 
unregulated informal sector to make ends meet. 
 The situation was bleak by the middle of 2020. By the height of the austral 
winter, Argentina’s national GDP was projected to contract by 9.9% within the year 
(IMF 2020), 40.9% of the country was in poverty, and 10.5% were considered indignant 
(INDEC 2020). An estimated 60,000 small to medium-sized businesses have closed, 
leaving anywhere from 600,000 to 800,000 people without jobs, contributing to a 16-
year high unemployment rate of 13.1% reported following the 2nd quarter of 2020 
(CAME 2020). Larger businesses have also been greatly impacted, with many large 
multinational corporations declaring their exit from the nation, including airlines and 
manufacturing facilities.  
(WHO 2020)
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Fernández Government Responses (Late 2019-Present) 
 Since the beginning of Argentina’s strict lockdown measures, Fernández's 
narrative has remained consistent, stating that the health of Argentina comes before all 
else, economy or otherwise. During a March 23rd press conference, the president stated: 
“Many have told me that I would destroy the economy with the quarantine. If the 
dilemma is the economy or life, I choose life. Afterward, we will see how to order the 
economy ”. As circumstances worsened and his popularity wained, many of his 6
interventionist tactics have been labeled as a catalyst for decline. The compromised state 
of the government has provided an opportunity for conspiracy theories and speculative 
narratives to develop , fostering mistrust. As time has gone on, ‘choosing life’ no longer 7
seems to be an adequate response for some social groups. Fernández has worked to shift 
the blame on his predecessor. 
  
 Fernández's speech on March 23rd "Muchos me decían que iba a destruir la economía con la 6
cuarentena. Si el dilema es la economía o la vida, yo elijo la vida. Después veremos cómo 
ordenar la economía” (Arnáez 2020)
 For example, there was a wave of conservative speculation that the government grounded all 7












































 Many of the measures taken by Fernández have come under fire. First and 
foremost, Fernández has wielded extraordinary amounts of power for the duration of 
the pandemic, due to Law 27.541, affording the executive a series of time-limited powers 
(Gargella 2020). The law covers what can be designated as a public emergency, outlines 
the realm of these powers, including economic and fiscal matters, in addition to health 
and social protections. This allowed Fernández to declare a ‘sanitary emergency’ in the 
wake of COVID-19, with these powers extendeding for one year (Gargella 2020). The 
majority of Argentina’s response to the pandemic relies on a series of emergency 
decrees, making many, particularly opponents to the current administration, critical of 
sustained overreach. Many of these decrees are aimed at maintaining productions of 
essential goods, financial assistance measures for families, businesses, and provinces; 
price freezes and maximums on essential supplies; and the construction of twelve 
emergency hospitals (Gargella 2020). Nonetheless, as the pandemic continues to unfold, 
the coercive forces of the state are being called into question through protest 
mobilizations and daily rhetoric in Córdoba. Federal measures do not equally assist or 
impact the population in the wake of growing poverty and economic precariousness, at 
Figure 3 – Poverty Rates in Argentina (INDEC 2020)
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times putting at-risk populations in greater danger, and leaving many without necessary 
aid .  8
 The ‘Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia', a 10,000 peso government aid package 
available to unemployed and informal workers, paid out three times in April, June, and 
August, has been one of the main sources of government support, particularly in the 
early months of restrictions. Based on the official conversion rate, this is equivalent to 
roughly $140-$150 USD, though the unofficial ‘Blue Dollar’ rate of roughly 190 pesos 
per USD reduces this value significantly. To put this into perspective, a COVID-19 test 
for an uninsured person — 36% of the population (Pan American Health Organization 
2017) — is 5,200 pesos . Given high unemployment and the meagerness of this 9
program, many are trapped in a situation of limited opportunities. Indeed, a growing 
percentage of the population has been pushed into poverty and indigence (see Figure 3 
above). This has generated a political crisis that is enmeshed in the public health and 
economic crises. The use of emergency powers of the presidency and declining 
conditions of living, employment, health, and well-being have left the Fernández 
administration in a political precarious position.   
 Lower-income households, particularly those living in what are classified as slums or villas, 8
has been disproportionately impacted due to overcrowded living conditions. During an outbreak 
in a villa outside of Buenos Aires — Villa Azul — was blocked off by police to prevent spread 
outside the community, trapping residents inside, with little access to public services. 3 million 
people live in villas in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. (Hoffman 2020) 
 As previously discussed, low-income, uninsured citizens can apply for government 9
subsidization of medical costs, however, given the current state of the healthcare system and 
competitive relationship between public and private medical care facilities, these subsidy 
requests are being rejected at growing rates. 
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 The economy Fernández inherited was operating at a substantial deficit pre-
pandemic. With the added expenses of emergency funds for struggling families and 
businesses, as well as looming negotiations with the IMF regarding paying back the debt 
incurred under Macri, the government needs more capital to close this gap, and more 
pesos in circulation to keep businesses from folding. Peronism in its current form is 
largely identifiable through its maintenance and expansion of social and welfare 
programs. Tax increases were approved before the pandemic, but a one-off capital levy 
or ‘wealth tax’ aimed specifically at Argentines with more than 2 million USD in assets, 
in addition to increases in retenciones have been the most drastic taxation policies 
undertaken thus far (O’Boyle 2020). To assist with access to capital, Fernandez has 
required that banks lend out 320 billion pesos at a reduced interest rate of 24% 
compared to the Central Bank rate of 38% (Comte 2020). This infringement on the 
autonomy of the Central Bank has concerned many, particularly as this pushes the 
previous ‘floating currency’ into the situation of a ‘dirty’ floating currency, or one that is 
being manipulated by government measures.   
 For many in Córdoba, neither saving the economy nor saving lives have been 
viable tactics, since this has left millions without work, without health, and without 
options. The anti-government mantra ‘Que se vayan todos’, famously utilized during the 
economic crisis of the early 2000s, has returned to the streets in many places. However, 
the real damage is located with those who have lost faith in their nation, and have 
determined that it is they themselves who must leave this time, in one capacity or 
another. With disintegrating hopes for the future, many are moving assets outside of 
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Argentina, while others hope they will soon follow, relocating to countries they deem to 
have greater opportunities.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that Argentina faced a triple crisis related to politics, 
economy, and public health in 2020. The discussion has examined the policies put in 
place by the neoliberal Macri government to liberalize the economy and the damage this 
eventually caused, resulting in rising inflation, poverty, devaluation, and the need for a 
massive IMF loan. The discussion has also focused on the Fernández administration and 
the protocols put in place to contain the COVID outbreak, deal with the fallout from the 
economy, and begin to overcome the recession and worsening poverty. However, the 
Fernández government’s use of emergency powers and failure to reverse the economic 
and public health crises has led to the delegitimization of the political system.    
Beginning with issues of government legitimacy caused by the Macri 
administration, economic precariousness placed many in circumstances highly 
susceptible to the ensuing COVID-19 pandemic. Rising case numbers despite strict 
government protocols, the inability of many to survive without returning to some form 
of work, and panic fatigue compounded to further call political legitimacy int oquestion. 
Because of this cyclical compounding, the people of Córdoba returned to traditional 
structures like protest and subversion to air grievances and regain the sense of normalcy 
the government was failing to provide. 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 Chapter 3: Córdoba’s 2020 Protests 
Introduction 
 Argentine society is entering a phase of restructuring. The pandemic has ushered 
in a new generation-defining catastrophe, and the people of Córdoba have worked to 
address these issues through protest. This chapter examines the emergence of protests 
in the city of Córdoba during 2020 in response to the triple crisis of political, economic, 
and public health conditions. The chapter argues that early protests were marked by 
activism ‘on wheels’ — appropriation of public spaces utilizing cars, and mild subversion 
through the breaking of lockdown measures. Later protests, however, were 
characterized by increasingly subversive tactics, disregarding social distancing and other 
health protocols to draw greater attention to particular protest messages about a wide 
range of issues. This chapter methodologically draws upon informal interviews, media 
coverage, and participant observation in Córdoba over the year as a first-hand witness of 
the COVID-19 outbreak in Argentina as well as the political, economic, and health 
impacts it generated.  
    
Early to Mid 2020 Protests  
 Protesting and mobilization are critical components of Argentine democracy. 
This is recognized by the government and citizens alike, and is a reflection of a healthy 
political system in which movements are a key check on government power. As protests 
started in Córdoba in a modified capacity, this symbolized a return to normalcy through 
the reclaiming of the streets as an extension of the democratic process.  
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 The city of Córdoba maintained strict lockdown requirements for months, but 
this did not stop protests from taking place within the city. Adapting to health and safety 
concerns, activists quickly devised new strategies to convey their platforms to the wider 
population. Protests within the city tend to follow a generic pattern (see Figure 4 below). 
Protestors will congregate at the centrally located Patio Olmos, a shopping center that 
sits in front of a roundabout where three major roads intersect. This open area, located 
in a highly frequented sector of the city, abuts several other small plazas, allowing for 
large congregations that are highly visible. These central spaces and intersections allow 
protestors to easily disrupt the circulation of traffic and to draw the attention of people 
walking through these zones and living in these neighborhoods. Parts of these roads 
may be entirely shut down if the group grows large enough, with casual participants 
driving by typically playing cuarteto music — a genre originating in Córdoba — and 
honking, often with signs carrying the movement’s slogans. While many protests are 
contained in this specific area, others will begin a few blocks away near the city’s central 
plaza and migrate to Patio Olmos, continuing up Avenida Hipolito Irigoyen towards a 
second large plaza — Plaza España — where five roads intersect in another large 
roundabout. Protests are common and highly sociable events, rapidly expanding in a 
matter of hours through word of mouth, social media, or stumbling upon an event, with 
growing numbers further enticing communal congregation. As such, this spirit of 
demonstration could not be quelled by social distancing orders, particularly as issues 
began to compound, resulting in protests expressing discontent with a specific problem 
but also systematically undermining government COVID protocols to enhance protest 
performances. 
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 Early protests following the imposition the lockdown set the tone for the 
emergence of a new facet of Argentine protest culture related to public health protocol 
subversion, albeit gradually at first. These movements theoretically adhered to protocols 
for COVID-19 by taking place in cars; however, even this undermined core government 
tenants as citizens were prohibited from leaving their homes except to purchase basic 
necessities. Though adhering to some public health measures, the protests also 
communicated the sentiment of overruling government decisions, adding a level of 
credibility to the cause by subtly risking a pandemic to demonstrate on behalf of the 
issue. Without traffic to obstruct, caravans of protestors drove slowly up main avenues, 
honking, playing loud music, and disrupting the otherwise quiet city. Vehicles’ signs, 
flags, and symbolism communicated support for causes ranging from union complaints 
to free public education to issue-based protests like objection to national judicial 
reforms. However, these protests lacked the presence and engagement of traditional 
demonstrations based on a culture of large-scale disruption.  
Figure 4 - Map of downtown Córdoba and typical pattern for mobile protests (Google Maps 2021)
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 Anti-government sentiments dominated much of the protest rhetoric, 
particularly as economic circumstances worsened, be that against provincial or federal 
government, specific politicians, or policies. On May 29th, a large protest against 
Córdoba’s Peronist Governor Juan Schiaretti took place, with vans toting a simple 
printed message: “Schiaretti = La Peor ”. This movement, conducted by the Unión de 10
Educadores de la Provincia de Córdoba  (UEPC), was aimed directly at the Governor’s 11
adjustments to retirement plans. It is difficult to distinguish demographics given that 
the movement was entirely made up of people driving, but given that it took place 
during the 10:00 and 11:00 hours on a Friday morning demonstrates that these 
protestors did not have work obligations at this time—members of the informal lower or 
working class sector would be reliant on working during this period of the day. The 
vehicles were also indicative of middle- or upper-class income levels.   
 As community attitudes began to relax and the fear of the pandemic began to 
dissipate following months of panic fatigue, demonstrations became more daring and 
overt from a public health subversion perspective, but remained in line with collective 
social ideals of taking the pandemic seriously so as to not alienate themselves from their 
supporting base. Following the protest against his retirement plan modifications, 
Governor Schiaretti made statements in support of protesting, with the stipulation of 
also adhering to health and safety protocols. “You can never lose sight of the need to 
take care of democracy … you cannot fall at risk of authoritarian attitudes ”. Schiaretti 12
 Schiaretti = The Worst10
 Union of Educators of the Province of Córdoba11
 Nunca se puede perder de vista la necesidad de cuidar la democracia … no se puede caer en 12
riesgo de tener actitudes autoritarias. (“Schiaretti Dijo Que Hay Que ‘Garantizar’ La Protesta 
Social, Pero ‘Sin Afectar Reglas Sanitarias.’”)
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would go on to urge other state actors to support these demonstrations, and to allow 
them to function in a manner that would not pose a public health risk, likening this 
permission to a situation of controlling chaos. “You have to understand these situations 
[protests] … the State has to shepherd and guarantee them so that they can develop 
without affecting sanitary rules ”. As discontent continued to grow, containing these 13
demonstrations would cease to be a possibility. Rhetoric became increasingly anti-
government, and displays further pushed the boundaries of pandemic protocols and 
regulations. 
Mid to Late 2020 Protests 
 The passage of time finally saw mild relaxations in COVID parameters within the 
city, during which time frustrations with the government’s strict approach began to 
receive increasing pushback. With the massive growth in unemployment, business 
closures, and social insecurity, discontent increasingly began to manifest in 
demonstrations. Whatever the main point of protest criticism, these movements 
fundamentally aligned against the government through the subversion of COVID 
regulations. Protest structurally shifted from a mission on wheels to a mixture of cars 
and individuals on foot, once again relying on sound impact, adding drumming and 
bullhorns to the arsenal, as well as firecrackers and colored smoke. Walking participants 
grew in number through the winter, as did the overall size of protests. Despite social 
distancing requirements, groups would physically gather, though nearly all wore masks. 
  Hay que entender esas situaciones …. el Estado tiene que encausarlas y garantizarlas para que 13
se puedan desarrollar sin afectar las reglas sanitarias (“Schiaretti Dijo Que Hay Que ‘Garantizar’ 
La Protesta Social, Pero ‘Sin Afectar Reglas Sanitarias.’”)
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By June, protests had returned to their original home outside of Patio Olmos, their 
frequency increased and participant numbers growing. The use of moderate subversion 
in these protests drew attention to their different causes, but without overshadowing the 
protest’s actual purpose. The point was not to derail the intended protest message with a 
digression into pandemic protocol.  
  On July 6th, 17 year old Valentino Blas Correas — Blas — was murdered by 
a police officer when shots were fired into a car that did a U-turn to avoid a police 
checkpoint, with bullets narrowly missing the other passengers. The social media outcry 
was immediate, and the following evening a massive protest took place in the center of 
Córdoba. The streets were packed with protestors, led by the victim’s family carrying a 
sign reading ‘Justicia por Blas ’ that stretched the width of the avenue. Many donned t-14
shirts with the same message, and other signs read ‘Ni una bala más, ni un Blas menos, 
Justicia por Blas ’. Despite thousands of demonstrators and a complete lack of social 15
distancing, there were no police in sight. The crowd primarily consisted of families and 
young people. All wore masks, more or less correctly. This protest can be analyzed on 
three levels. First, there is a call for justice and condemnation of police brutality. 
Second, the rhetoric ‘ni un Blas menos’ alludes to another prominent Argentine social 
movement — Ni Una Menos . This grassroots feminist movement has campaigned 16
against gender-based violence, and spread across South America in recent years. Third, 
there are clear subversive undertones visible in the lack of social distancing, refusing to 
adhere to government requests in the face of a state-caused tragedy. These elements 
 ‘Justice for Blas'14
 ‘Not one bullet more, not one Blas less, justice for Blas’15
 Not one [woman] less’16
!40
interplay to express public dissent, to link the demonstrations to another well-known 
anti-violence movement, and intentionally disregard COVID protocols in a massive, 
widely visible, and unregulated display. 
 Anti-government protests surrounding COVID-19 restrictions have drawn on 
imagery and symbolism from the contemporary history of national protest. A protest on 
September 19th utilized rhetoric centered on ‘libertad’. Demonstrators referenced the 
2001 economic crisis slogan ‘Que se vayan todos’, while others aired specific grievances 
like ‘basta de usar al senado como aguantadero ’, or ‘no a la reforma judicial.’ The 17
protests are nationalistic, the streets filling with supporters carrying Argentine flags, a 
protest style known as banderazos (Aimar 2020). These events are highly inclusive: all 
demographics can be witnessed, and vendors line the sidewalks selling Argentine flags 
to passersby who wish to join. In addition to rhetoric referencing constitutional abuses 
and abuses of power, this imagery used by protestors attempts to position participants 
as the true representation of Argentina, as a patriotic force seeking to defend its 
democracy and the will of the people. These demonstrations show how the people, as a 
representative of the nation and protectors of democracy, will not silently permit 
perceived abuses. 
 On October 12th, massive anti-government protests took place in cities across the 
country, however Córdoba’s demonstration quickly evolved into a large-scale 
participatory performance tailored to suit the culture of the city. Beginning as a protest 
following predictable rhetoric against ongoing government policies and the waving of 
the national flag, the event quickly morphed into a street party of thousands. This street 
 Stop using the Senate as a supporter17
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party involved a crowd of young people, many without masks — an uncommon sight in 
public spaces. Moreover, these street party protestors rebuffed social distancing as loud 
electronic music, a genre intertwined with the city’s identity, blared. Electronic music 
and rave culture are key elements to the culture of Córdoba, particularly as a youth 
outlet — it is the sound of local nightlife, and the summer is dominated by electronic 
festivals in fields and hangers outside the city. According to one participant: 
It was actually a normal protest in one way — against the government, and on the other 
hand, electronic party organizers supposedly "calling" to have a kind-of party there.  18
These subversive actions by young people—violating social distancing and masking 
protocols—are directly in contrast to government COVID-19 precautions, in addition to 
being a display of local culture and youth frustrations. These young adults took the 
streets to party in a way that had been taken from them for nearly nine months. By these 
actions, young people are actively appropriating public space in protest for their youth 
With their freedom to freely associate, gather, and in this case, party, stripped by 
government protocols, they turned to traditional outlets and unexpected methods of 
political subversion to voice discontent. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines how protests emerged in Córdoba against the political, economic, 
and public health crises during 2020. I argue that the protests began with a logic of a 
mission ‘on wheels’ that violated the lockdown measures but maintained social 
distancing and mask requirements, be that out of respect for government authority or 
 En realidad era una protesta normal en una parte contra el gobierno y en otra parte 18
organizadores de fiestas electronicas supuestamente "reclamando" hicieron tipo fiesta ahí
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fear of the virus. However, protest forms changed as the lockdown measures were 
relaxed. Protests moved beyond car-based missions to include cars and walkers that 
wore masks but violated social distancing measures. Finally, by late 2020, there were 
protests—involving youth street parties—that violated social distancing and mask 
protocols. This reflects the tactic of increasing subversion of public health rules to gain 
public attention to protest a variety of issues.       
 Many of the underlying elements visible in the 2020 protests were not new, and 
recycle tactics from the great political movements of the past. As protests expanded, the 
deeply emotive aspects of these movements became exceedingly clear, drawing on 
cultural forms of expression to speak in a uniquely Cordobesa voice with the 
incorporation of regional elements like cuarteto music and youth rave culture.  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Chapter 4: Understanding Youth Perspectives 
Introduction  
 This chapter examines youth protest in response to the multifaceted crisis in 
Argentina. It offers a glimpse into the lived reality of young people in Córdoba as the 
world they have known has been fundamentally altered, utilizing interviews and 
participant observations from March until December 2020. Through this approach, I 
examine reactions and rationalizations of changing social practices, understandings of 
the government, and a new emerging youth consciousness as young people grapple with 
uncertainty and what it means to be Argentine. This chapter argues that young adults 
have embraced the politics of everyday subversion. Going beyond public protests, young 
adults have sought to rebuild youth culture through appropriation of city spaces during 
the day and at night in ways that challenge the legitimacy of government public health 
protocols. Through these acts of everyday subversion, youth culture expresses a desire 
for a return to the normalcy that this crisis has erased. 
Social Life in Córdoba 
 A densely packed city dating back to early Spanish colonial rule and Jesuit 
mission settlement in the late 16th century, Córdoba is a bustling concrete jungle 
dominated by pedestrian foot traffic and public transit (Historia y Memoria). The city 
contains a multitude of barrios — neighborhoods — each possessing a unique character 
and community, making even adjacent barrios distinguishable. For this reason, a strong 
‘barrio identity’ has developed — close, friendly relationships between neighbors, from 
small talk at the lavandería (laundromat) to a first name basis with verdulería (vegetable 
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store) employees to city street workers carrying groceries to a passerby’s apartment. 
Cordobesas utilize public spaces as an extension of the home, even into the street, be 
that by bringing chairs to sit outside of a kiosco (kiosk) or chatting on a curb — the city 
is never quiet. Just as the street serves as a prominent space for socialization, municipal 
public spaces act as an essential conduit for supra-barrio interactions that create urban 
identification with and solidarity for Córdoba. Mate , a traditional tea, is a key signifier 19
of national Argentine identity, in addition to being a quotidian social practice (Yerba 
Mate Argentina). In the mid-afternoon, public spaces, from the open fields of Parque 
Sarmiento  to the open stairs and ledges surrounding the concrete fountain at Paseo 20
del Buen Pastor, contain friends and family sharing mate, cigarettes, and conversation, 
pausing for community and reflection each day. 
 Youth social life in Córdoba is also defined by its nightlife. Urban nightlife 
involves boliche  culture, the previa , and the after component. In addition to 21 22
nightlife, there are social gatherings across networks of kin and friends and 
acquaintances, including an early evening cervecito or an asado , an Argentine 23
tradition of grilling often beginning in the afternoon and running well into the night. 
Gastronomy is central to the community building process, inviting large groups to 
 A traditional South American tea with ritualistic communal drinking practices in which water 19
is poured over dried leaves, drunk out of a bombilla (explain) through a metal straw and passed 
around a group
 Parque Sarmineto is the largest public park in the city of Córdoba, located in the Nueva 20
Córdoba region of the city adjacent to the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
 Argentine slang for a nightclub21
 Pregame22
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gather on a terrace. Music and the scent of food cooking fill the air, as neighbors 
convene groups that may spontaneously grow. Indeed, the urban cultural dynamics of 
Córdoba revolve around the fundamental element of shared spaces: the street, parks, 
open air markets, or central plazas. These shared spaces create physically proximity, 
emotional warmth, and a sense of togetherness, intimacy, and solidarity.  
The Pandemic and New Cultural Practices of Togetherness 
 The introduction of a new, deadly virus posed a threat to youth socialization 
practices and cultural norms in Córdoba. A swift, total lockdown in a city dominated by 
one-bedroom apartments left the chronically sociable society paralyzed, with 
interactions strictly prohibited and the use of public spaces forbidden for months. Social 
distancing measures reshaped everyday cultural norms and impacted a lively economic 
sector based on entertainment. It eradicated traditional gatherings and customary 
greeting practices. Gone were the days of a kiss on the cheek to each person in a room, 
replaced instead with distant elbow bumps and maintaining a minimum one meter of 
distance between all parties in any public setting. An early mask mandate was well 
respected, particularly given the constant presence of police and military on the street, 
standing guard on every corner. The nation and city’s public health approach in late 
March and April cultivated palpable fear in early days when case numbers were in the 
single digits. In this initial period of lockdown, everyday social interaction was sharply 
curbed, leaving many lonely and alone, drastically impacting mental health, and 
alienating community members from one another out of fear.  
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 New cultural practices began to appear that initially expressed solidarity with the 
public health mandate. In the early days of lockdown, neighbors would bang pots and 
pans, clapping and cheering in unison at 9:00pm each evening in support of healthcare 
workers. There were stories of loud, socially distant parties between apartment 
buildings, blaring loud music from speakers as people gathered on balconies. As the 
days wore on and lockdown in Córdoba continued to be extended, a spirit of solidarity to 
flatten the curve dissipated and was replaced with growing resentment and animosity 
towards government protocol. As discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrations 
began to grow. Also, covert subversion flourished. The government loosened public 
health restrictions, and outings were permitted based on national ID number (DNI) and 
corresponding week days, as well as restricted access to public spaces for exercise. 
 Fewer government regulations created spaces of opportunity, namely for 
prohibited gatherings and manipulation of legal parameters. This was aided by lax law 
enforcement approaches. Despite distancing measures and mask mandates, green 
spaces became an open space of youthful subversion. This began with some people 
exercising without a mask, followed by increasingly large groups gathering for mate or a 
game of soccer. The reopening of the skate park within Parque Sarmiento in May 
reignited the prevalent skating community within the shelter of a literal safe space — 
surrounded by a tall fence, police, and monitoring authorities. However, the police 
allowed free use of the space without regulation. Public and green spaces have always 
functioned as gathering places and the lungs of the city, but, without other options, they 
became the social lifeline for many residents. 
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 There was a performativity to public health regulation and caution at work in 
Córdoba among the government and police. Lax enforcement by public authorities 
created the performance or semblance of robust regulation that enabled citizens to 
circumvent the rules and—in some cases—flout noncompliance.  The relaxing of public 
health rules led to case numbers skyrocketing and an infection rate among the highest in 
the world. The initial lockdown quickly turned into a panic fatigue, with rising apathy 
and the perception of minimal risk creating a false sense of security visible in 
improperly worn masks and distancing policies in bars and restaurants that neglected 
consideration of ventilation or a defined maximum capacity. Once more, lax policing 
created the perfect structure for viral transmission. As Interviewee A remarked:  
That's why I think that when they were relaxing [quarantine parameters] or yes they 
were releasing people, raising the quarantine a little, they are not so strict, hey, well, no, 
I suppose they couldn't measure - measure themselves rather well and they left and well 
they caused the greatest amount of infections.  24
From their perspective, this interviewee saw rising case numbers to be the result of 
relaxing restrictions, but as the fault of the people, who lacked the ability to adequately 
judge the circumstances and restrain themselves to prevent the spread of the virus. 
Lulled into a false sense of security, they underestimated the reality of the pandemic in 
Argentina, taking advantage of leniencies as if the threat of COVID was no longer real. 
Illegal parties began in late May and June, growing larger and more frequent 
throughout the winter, and expanding even further with the return of summer. In early 
months sneaking people into a household was difficult due to heavy street monitoring. 
 “Cuando fueron liberando o si liberando a la gente, levantando un poco la cuarentena que no 24
son tan estricta eh la gente bueno no, no supongo medir — medirse mas bien y se largó a salir y 
bueno se causaron la mayor cantidad de los contagios”
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With time obvious loud music, shouting, and multicolored lights—all noticeable from 
the street—rarely met with any police intervention. Secret gatherings —known as 
clandestinos — could number anywhere from within the ten-person limit implemented 
during the winter, to parties of fifty or more, with little to no repercussions, even if the 
police were specifically alerted. These events were handled with simple warnings at the 
front door without any further investigation, despite neighbors calling to report large 
parties. Efforts to reinstate stringent measures were moot, particularly given that the 
existing spread was the result of an already outlawed activity that was being perpetuated 
discreetly, and actively ignored by the enforcing body.  
Perspectives on the Government 
 Young Cordobenses articulated nuanced, ambivalent perspectives on the federal, 
provincial, and municipal government. Though they dismissed government actions as 
ineffective, performative, and economically harmful, young adults also recognized the 
unprecedented nature of the pandemic and the attempts by government officials to keep 
Argentines safe from a public health standpoint.   
 Young Cordobenses expressed various complaints about the federal government 
related to COVID-19 management. These complaints introduced a new found agency 
visible in social decision making. Individuals emphasized self-governance. Where a 
single person openly understands the rationality behind COVID restrictions and 
government actions, they simultaneously contradict this through electing to follow their 
own personal guidelines instead, disregarding facets that they deem unnecessary or 
burdensome. This manifests itself in a variety of manners, ranging from participating in 
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illegal gatherings to wearing masks improperly in institutions that require them. In 
response to asking if acting against government rules were a form of rebellion, one 
participant answered: 
Yes, obviously yes, totally. Apart from that, that is ... They [the government] did not do 
things well ... I know that they are not doing well, I know that they will not be good, so 
that is why doing what is prohibiting is not so bad ... they are prohibiting something that 
really should not prohibit.  25
From this participant’s perspective, the Argentine government had not handled the 
pandemic well, and because of this discredits the protocols and restrictions put in place. 
In their opinion, the precautions are unnecessary, and as such, subject to being 
circumvented based on personal discretion, introducing a degree of self-rule. 
 There were also critiques of the Fernández administration and the economic 
outcomes of managing the pandemic. Young adults voiced significant frustrations with a 
stalled economy, evaporating opportunities, and the psychological impact on the 
youngest generation. Some stressed the inadequacy of the economic response from the 
Fernández administration to the scale of the problem. The government developed a 
stimulus and social welfare support policy designed to support workers, minimum wage 
workers, and vulnerable groups, increase monetary transfers to poor families, and 
ensure social security payments to lower income beneficiaries through a package worth 
6.0% of the national GDP in 2020 (Policy Responses to COVID-19: Argentina). As such, 
many families turned to government payments to make ends meet, and household 
 Si, obviamente si, totalmente. Aparte de eso o sea … No hicieron las cosas bien  … se que no 25
están haciendo bien se que no van a ser bien por eso por ahi lo aquello esta prohibiendo no esta 
tan mal que lo no se … lo que esta prohibiendo algo que realmente no debe prohibir.
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members searched for additional work to replace or supplement incomes. Young people 
were faced with difficult decisions regarding the future. Interviewee F remarked:  
The government gave an aid plan for people who did not have a job or at least a [formal]  
job and they gave stimuluses of 10,000 pesos per month. I was able to collect just one 
because you had to still be unemployed, so the following month I could not get paid 
because I started working. But this does not seem like a good measure to me because it 
was 10,000 pesos — in Argentina that is very little, and it was a single payment per 
family. For a family , 10,000 pesos when you do not have a job and have two or three 
children it’s impossible, I think they are not even eating  26
The stipulations to qualify for government aid left many families in difficult financial 
positions as business closures caused jobs to evaporate. This interview participant was 
fortunate to find two part time jobs to supplement his family’s income as the small 
business they owned suffered, in addition to being a full-time university student. With 
little free time, Interviewee F’s grades suffered, and they often spoke of leaving the 
country for better opportunities elsewhere, saving money in dollars to protect whatever 
assets they were able to accumulate. There was no clear end or solution to repair the 
state of the national economy, which diminished hope for the future. 
 Despite these critiques of the government, young Cordobenses also voiced more 
ambivalent perspectives that recognized the difficulty for any administration to deal 
with an unexpected situation of such magnitude. Interviewee B remarked:
 “El gobierno dio un plan de ayuda para la gente que no tenía trabajo o por lo menos trabajo en 26
blanco y bueno dieron bonos de 10,000 pesos por mes yo pude cobrar un solo porque necesito 
mantener no tiene trabajo pero después el mes siguiente no lo pude cobrar porque empecé a 
trabajar. pero esto no me parece una buena medida porque era 10,000 pesos en Argentina es 
muy poco y era un solo bono por familia y para una familia 10,000 pesos, cuando no tiene 
trabajo y tiene dos hijos o tres es imposible creo que están ni comer.”
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I think the measures were justified in the first moment that they were taken because 
well, as I said before, it is a very new situation, eh, very extraordinary, so well, we really 
do not know what could work and what not ... When they started taking this type of 
measure, at a time when people were tired and they needed to work, it's a bit unjustified. 
Protocols could have be established and things would work a little more freely.  27
This statement expresses some understanding of the legitimate public health risk and 
how “extraordinary” the situation was. However, as the economic downturn accelerated, 
the faults of the government were compounded as they recognized the need to adapt to 
ensure that people could work and survive.  
 These anti-government perspectives facilitated the protests that began in late 
May and contributed to the sense of illegitimacy and inadequacy of the political 
leadership in Argentina. This political perspective fostered the spirit of subversion that 
took hold in urban green spaces, public areas, and homes. The restoration of cultural 
practices of everyday life—being together, drinking mate, dancing, playing music, and 
nightlife—became the goal for this politics of resistance. The problem was that this 
cultural restoration could not be achieved as people struggled to survive, worked odd 
jobs, and had other concerns related to family, businesses, and education. 
Forging a New Youth Consciousness in Córdoba  
 COVID-19 placed a critical role on the individual, relying on personal moral 
obligation to close this gap between regulation and realistic policing capacities. This 
 Yo creo que las medidas eran justificado en su primer momento que se tomaron em porque 27
bueno como dije antes es una situación muy nueva eh muy extraordinaria, entonces bueno 
realmente no sabemos que podías funcionar y que no… Ya cuando se empezaron a tomar este 
tipo de medidas en un momento en cuando la gente estaba cansado necesitaran trabajar aye 
bueno es un poco injustificado se podrían  establecer protocolos y las cosas funcionarán un poco 
mas libremente.
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brought about debates of communal obligation and Argentine society in general focused 
on the issue of “consciousness” or “awareness” (conciencia). 
On the level of health, I think it’s [COVID regulations] good because the Argentine 
people don’t have a lot of consciousness about the cause — no one uses a mask, the 
people look for , I don't know, social gatherings and the like… If we were another, more 
conscious society things would be better… At least our society is a society that lacks 
education and there are a lot of people that aren't conscientious about many things… In 
other countries they can distinguish between what is bad and what is good. I think we 
are a very irresponsible society.  28
This concept of consciousness is being discussed through an understanding of the direct 
impact the choices of a single person can have on the wider community, resulting in a 
multilevel understanding of culpability. The reality of public consciousness is far more 
nuanced than protest propaganda; mobilizing against the government while masked 
demonstrates that despite anger over management approaches, the individual is aware 
of their role in the greater system.  
 The notion of self-governance results from a lack of belief in the government. 
This is not a new phenomenon, and arguably a tenant of Argentine culture, particularly 
visible in this case along generational boundaries due to the inherent risk and fear of 
contracting the virus.  
People if they want to get together, will meet… Most of the people, if they want to get 
together, they want to do something they are going to do - that's the problem. You can 
 “Al nivel saludo creo que esta bien porque la gente argentino no — no tiene mucha conciencia 28
en la causa de nadie usa barbijo, la gente busca — no se — reuniones sociales y e igual … Si 
fuéramos otra sociedad mas consiente mejor sería… Por lo menos nuestra sociedad es una 
sociedad en que falta educación y hay mucha gente que no es consiente en muchas cosas … En 
otros países puedan darse cuenta en que esta mala y que esta buena. Creo que estamos una 
sociedad bastante inconsciente.”
!53
only control the way it’s done, that's why there are so many clandestine meetings [illegal 
gatherings].  29
Once more, this reenforces the notion of performativity, but from the perspective of the 
individual as a subversive unit. Where counterculture was revolved around illegally 
smoking marijuana in public, youth counterculture has taken on new forms related to 
the art of evasion, circumventing roadblocks designed to prevent potential virus-
spreading movement, gathering in public spaces moments after police leave, and 
hosting massive parties. Raising stakes and consequences also affords a heightened 
degree of self-instilled power and intentionality. While individuals understand why 
gatherings are prohibited, it is approached like an honor code system rather than a 
criminal offense in the eyes of the proud, independent self-governing actors who—given 
the issue of government legitimacy—have taken power for themselves. 
 Young people in Córdoba are also situating themselves within the national 
experience, looking to tradition and precedence as an explanation for their subversive 
behaviors. An interviewee stated the following after being asked if this trespassing 
mentality was a product of Córdoba uniquely, or a nationwide attitude:  
I believe it’s very Argentine, very Argentina to break the rules, to always look for 
something to do that goes against what you’re told — it’s very Argentine, very cultural.  30
In many ways, this interview statement establishes that youth and everyday subversion 
are merely an extension of the national cultural tradition; these actions are a 
 La gente si quieran reunir se va a reunir … La mayoría de la gente si quieran juntar se quieran 29
hacer algo lo va a hacer — ese el problema. Pueda controlar la forma solo de hacerlo por eso hay 
tantas reuniones clandestinas. 
 “Yo creo que es muy argentino, muy argentino de traspasar las reglas, de siempre buscarle el 30
hacer la contra de lo que dice — muy argentino, muy cultural”
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continuation of the status-quo, rather than a specific response to the current political, 
economic, and public health crisis. Once more, the youth of Córdoba are seeing cultural 
tradition as an avenue to return to normalcy on their own terms, after being let down by 
state actors. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has explored the nuance of rationalizing COVID-19 and the impact it 
has had by the youth in Córdoba. I argue that despite a degree of empathy with the 
government responses to the pandemic, young people are turning to self-rule to attain a 
return to normalcy the government has failed to provide. Engaging in the politics of 
everyday subversion — casual acts of rebellion against what is deemed illegitimate or 
unnecessary — the youth of Córdoba have appropriated their own understanding of 
what it means to be Argentine and what they are owed by the state. Frustrated by a 
triple crisis that has created massive uncertainty, they have become brokers for their 
own futures as they seek to rebuild a future in the wake of drastic changes that have 
permanently altered the lives they once knew. 
The impacts of COVID-19 have created a new space for the individual within 
society, as an actor’s role in self-governance has become more critical due to the nature 
of a spreading disease. In grappling with top-down mandates and protocols, the 
individual is propelled into a moral debate, and as such is able to elect a form of self 
governance in the face of policing insufficiencies. As inadequate government support, 
economic collapse, and growing unemployment affect the people, they are afforded 
growing agency through subversion. As local culture is redefined and government and 
!55
world-views shift, the individual as an actor with heightened agency holds the position 
to negotiate the terms of their involvement, choosing to work for or against preexisting 
narratives and shape the future of entire communities. 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Conclusion 
 This thesis has examined the reaction of the people of Córdoba to the triple crisis 
catalyzed by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with an emphasis on protest culture, 
resistance, and youth subversion. I have argued that the youth of Córdoba, motivated by 
disillusionment with the government, have turned to politics of everyday youth 
subversion to reconcile state failures with the future they have lost on their own terms. 
Coupling traditional Argentina tactics like protests and subversion with rebellious youth 
subculture, the youth of Córdoba sought to reconstruct a sense of normalcy through the 
solidarity of appropriating the world they once knew into a recreation of a recognizable 
future for themselves.    
The youth of Córdoba are faced with never before seen political, economic, and 
public health circumstances. The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown their futures and the 
future of Argentina into a space of unprecedented uncertainty, but also altered the 
understanding of everyday life. Young people in Córdoba have turned to everyday 
subversion to restore a sense of normalcy and configure their new reality within the 
framework of the nation they have always known. Young people have engaged in public 
protests with other groups to denounce government failures to deal with the economic 
and social implications of the pandemic, while also engaging in subcultural resistance in 
everyday activities.    
 Chapter 2 examined the causes of the triple crisis as well as the context for 
civilian disillusionment with government practices. It showed how the Macri and 
Fernández administrations have each contributed to these crises, and the priorities and 
strategies utilized by the current administration to address political, economic, and 
!57
public health issues. As state failures became more evident, criticisms gave way to the 
return of traditional protest practices to air communal grievances.     
 Chapter 3 examined 2020 protests in Córdoba, their adherence to traditional 
practices, and modifications with respect to the public health crisis. This chapter 
demonstrated an added layer of performativity to already salient protest practices 
through tones of increasing subversion of public health protocols to draw greater 
attention to a given cause. These events would eventually create a merging space for 
underlying, everyday subversive youth behaviors as protests became a way to 
appropriate public spaces into cultural events reminiscent of normal life and youth 
culture in Córdoba.  
Chapter 4 investigated youth responses to the triple crisis in Córdoba. This 
chapter showed the nuance of understanding held by young people, in addition to the 
way they rationalize and experience state failures. Disillusioned with the government, 
youth in Córdoba turned to everyday subversion to reclaim their lives and reconstruct a 
recognizable future for themselves in the wake of government failures to provide a 
return to normalcy.   
 This project contributes to academic literature on Argentine political culture, 
youth responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, and research on Córdoba pertaining to 
protests practices and youth culture. Based on participant observation and interviews 
conducted in Córdoba during 2020, this project has explored the nuanced youth 
experience to these unprecedented circumstances. Finally, it examines how Argentines 
in the “second city” are reconfiguring themselves through protest culture and new 
socialization practices amidst the pandemic. This study also begs questions for future 
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research on the communal impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of Córdoba in 
the construction and affirmation of the Argentine experience, and the role of youth in 
the creation and perpetuation of culture and communal values.  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